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摘要:
航空货运联盟的应用有助于航空公司的业务经营,航空公司通过低运营成本,提高服务质量,使得用户获得较大的满足感。以航空货运联盟为基础,探讨不同航空公司在航空货运联盟中有关航线运输业务自营或外包的决策问题。考虑前景理论中的损失厌恶,采用改进的风险价值函数刻画航空公司的成本损失;建立得益矩阵,并通过动态演化博弈分析决策过程。结果表明:当自营成本分摊系数越大,外包成本分摊系数、风险损失系数和风险凹凸系数越小,固定成本越大,飞机的单位运输成本越小,收益率越大时,S航空公司若货运量大于其他航空公司,则宜采取业务自营,反之,则业务外包;当自营成本分摊系数越小,外包成本分摊系数越大时,S航空公司选择自营概率越大;当S航空公司货运量越大时,其选择自营概率越大;其他航空公司自营概率越大,S航空公司自营概率越小。
Abstract:The application of the airline freight alliance helps the airline's business operations, and the airlines improve the quality of service through low operating costs, so that users get a greater sense of satisfaction. Based on the airline freight alliance, this paper discusses the decision-making of different airlines in the airline freight alliance about the self-operation or outsourcing of air route transport operation. In the model, considering the loss aversion in prospect theory, the improved var function is used to describe the cost loss of airlines. The benefit matrix of both sides of the game is established, and the decision-making process is analyzed by dynamic evolutionary game. The results show that, when the cost coefficient of self-operation allocation is larger, the cost coefficient of outsourcing allocation, the risk loss coefficient and the risk concave-convex coefficient are smaller, the fixed cost is larger, and the unit transportation cost of aircraft is smaller, the yield rate is larger, and S airline should adopt business self-operation if their business volume is larger than other airlines; otherwise, it should outsource its own business. The smaller self-operating cost sharing coefficient and the larger outsourcing cost sharing coefficient, the larger self-operating probability of S airline. The larger the freight volume of S airline, the larger self-operating probability of S airline. The larger self-operating probability of other airlines, the smaller self-operating probability of S airline.
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表 1 S航空公司与其他航空公司博弈的得益矩阵
Table 1. Game benefit matrix of S airline and other airlines
其他航空公司 S航空公司 运输业务自营 运输业务外包 运输业务自营 运输业务外包 (A7, A8) 表 2 五个均衡点的局部稳定性分析
Table 2. Local stability analysis of five equilibrium points
均衡点 行列式符号 迹符号 局部稳定性 A(0, 0) + + 不稳定 B(1, 0) + - ESS C(0, 1) + - ESS D(1, 1) + + 不稳定 E(a, b) - 0 鞍点 注:a=[A8+CP-(t-α)CTdD2]/{A8-A4-[t+(1-β-α)]·CTdD2}, b=[A7+CP-(t-α)CTdD1]/{A7-A5-[t+(1-β-α)]CTdD1}。 表 3 不同情形下的均衡点
Table 3. Equilibrium points under different conditions
固定参数 变动参数 E点 演化方向 D1=10 t
D2=20 t
α=0.6β=1.1 (0.8474,0.647 3) (0,1) β=1.2 (0.889 7,0.679 7) β=1.3 (0.936 5,0.715 4) β=1.4 (0.988 4,0.755 0) D1=10 t
D2=20 t
β=1.4α=0.1 (0.990 9,0.808 2) (1,0) α=0.3 (0.990 1,0.790 0) α=0.5 (0.989 0,0.767 9) α=0.7 (0.987 7,0.740 7) α=0.9 (0.986 1,0.706 1) D1=10 t
α=0.6
β=1.4D2=5 t (0.275 0,0.608 3) (0,1) D2=10 t (0.702 4,0.658 4) D2=15 t (0.867 3,0.712 0) (1,0) D2=20 t (0.988 4,0.755 0) D2=20 t
α=0.6
β=1.4D1=5 t (0.949 0,0.275 3) (0,1) D1=10 t (0.988 4,0.755 0) D1=20 t 不在范围内 D1=25 t -
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