北京航空航天大学学报 ›› 2020, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (7): 1247-1257.doi: 10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2019.0468

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于改进前景理论的航空货运联盟博弈分析

闫妍1, 张锦1,2, 唐秋宇1   

  1. 1. 西南交通大学 交通运输与物流学院, 成都 610031;
    2. 西南交通大学 综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室, 成都 610031
  • 收稿日期:2019-09-02 发布日期:2020-07-18
  • 通讯作者: 张锦 E-mail:zhjswjtu@home.swjtu.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:闫妍 女,博士研究生。主要研究方向:航空物流网络系统优化与设计。
    张锦 男,博士,教授,博士生导师。主要研究方向:物流系统规划与优化、供应链管理。
    唐秋宇 女,硕士研究生。主要研究方向:综合交通物流网络系统优化。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金(17XGL013)

Game analysis of airline freight alliance based on improved prospect theory

YAN Yan1, ZHANG Jin1,2, TANG Qiuyu1   

  1. 1. School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;
    2. National United Engineering Laboratory of Integrated and Intelligent Transportation, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
  • Received:2019-09-02 Published:2020-07-18
  • Supported by:
    National Social Science Fund of China (17XGL013)

摘要: 航空货运联盟的应用有助于航空公司的业务经营,航空公司通过低运营成本,提高服务质量,使得用户获得较大的满足感。以航空货运联盟为基础,探讨不同航空公司在航空货运联盟中有关航线运输业务自营或外包的决策问题。考虑前景理论中的损失厌恶,采用改进的风险价值函数刻画航空公司的成本损失;建立得益矩阵,并通过动态演化博弈分析决策过程。结果表明:当自营成本分摊系数越大,外包成本分摊系数、风险损失系数和风险凹凸系数越小,固定成本越大,飞机的单位运输成本越小,收益率越大时,S航空公司若货运量大于其他航空公司,则宜采取业务自营,反之,则业务外包;当自营成本分摊系数越小,外包成本分摊系数越大时,S航空公司选择自营概率越大;当S航空公司货运量越大时,其选择自营概率越大;其他航空公司自营概率越大,S航空公司自营概率越小。

关键词: 航空货运联盟, 业务自营, 业务外包, 动态演化博弈, 改进前景理论

Abstract: The application of the airline freight alliance helps the airline's business operations, and the airlines improve the quality of service through low operating costs, so that users get a greater sense of satisfaction. Based on the airline freight alliance, this paper discusses the decision-making of different airlines in the airline freight alliance about the self-operation or outsourcing of air route transport operation. In the model, considering the loss aversion in prospect theory, the improved var function is used to describe the cost loss of airlines. The benefit matrix of both sides of the game is established, and the decision-making process is analyzed by dynamic evolutionary game. The results show that, when the cost coefficient of self-operation allocation is larger, the cost coefficient of outsourcing allocation, the risk loss coefficient and the risk concave-convex coefficient are smaller, the fixed cost is larger, and the unit transportation cost of aircraft is smaller, the yield rate is larger, and S airline should adopt business self-operation if their business volume is larger than other airlines; otherwise, it should outsource its own business. The smaller self-operating cost sharing coefficient and the larger outsourcing cost sharing coefficient, the larger self-operating probability of S airline. The larger the freight volume of S airline, the larger self-operating probability of S airline. The larger self-operating probability of other airlines, the smaller self-operating probability of S airline.

Key words: airline freight alliance, business self-operation, business outsourcing, dynamic evolutionary game, improved prospect theory

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