北京航空航天大学学报 ›› 1999, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (5): 592-595.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

股份合作制下的委托-代理分析

高远洋, 陈良猷, 袁志陕   

  1. 北京航空航天大学 管理学院
  • 收稿日期:1998-04-28 发布日期:2010-11-19
  • 作者简介:男 34岁 博士生 100083 北京

Principal-Agent Analysis under Stock-Cooperation System

Gao Yuanyang, Chen Liangyou, Yuan Zhishan   

  1. Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,School of Management
  • Received:1998-04-28 Published:2010-11-19

摘要: 指出股份合作制的一个重要特征是委托人内化,即企业员工互为委托人及代理人.通过一个简单的企业模型,将股份合作制的这一特征纳入委托-代理理论的分析框架,研究表明,在股份合作制下,尽管股权结构对员工积极性的发挥有重要的影响,但它并不能很好地解决员工"搭便车"(free-rider)问题,而一些在一般企业里行之有效的激励措施,在股份合作制企业里却可能失效.

Abstract: This paper introduces an important characteristic of the enterprises under the stock-cooperation system, i.e. the internalization of the principal, which means the employees of the enterprise are both principals and agents at the same time. This point is taken into the principal-agent analysis of the enterprises with a simple model. The results show that under this system, although the allotment of shares of an enterprise has an important effect on employees' enthusiasm, it can't solve the employees' free-rider problem well and some incentive measures which are effective in other enterprises are probably no longer effective in this case.

中图分类号: 


版权所有 © 《北京航空航天大学学报》编辑部
通讯地址:北京市海淀区学院路37号 北京航空航天大学学报编辑部 邮编:100191 E-mail:jbuaa@buaa.edu.cn
本系统由北京玛格泰克科技发展有限公司设计开发