Option games model of firm′s investment strategy in oligopoly
Qiu Wanhua1, Yu Dongping2*
1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100083, China;
2. Institute of National Defense Economy and Management, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China
The firm′s investment strategy was examined in oligopoly and the firm′s optimal equilibrium exercise strategy of real options was analyzed systemicallyunder incomplete competition. The research shows that there are three equilibriums, such as preemption, sequence and simultaneous investment, when existing negative externalities, However, there is just simultaneous investment equilibrium, when positive externalities. The firm′s value and optimal investment threshold increase with the raise of market uncertainty. Competitive interaction accelerates investment, furthermore the threshold is between monopolistic investment threshold and Marshallian investment tlhreshold, even though the firm number is infinite.