北京航空航天大学学报社科版 ›› 2020, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (4): 78-85.DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2020.0045

• 公共政策与治理 • 上一篇    下一篇

集体腐败的博弈模型分析:生成、扩散与分化机制

宋伟   

  1. 北京科技大学 廉政研究中心, 北京 100083
  • 收稿日期:2020-02-16 发布日期:2020-07-31
  • 作者简介:宋伟(1982-),男,黑龙江哈尔滨人,北京科技大学廉政研究中心主任,教授,博士,研究方向为廉政与治理.
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金(17CDJ005);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(17JZD007)

Game Model Analysis of Collective Corruption: Mechanisms of Generation, Diffusion and Differentiation

SONG Wei   

  1. Anti-Corruption Research Center, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
  • Received:2020-02-16 Published:2020-07-31

摘要: 集体腐败已经成为中国腐败发生的显著特征,在近年来查处的腐败案件中,集体腐败所占的比例日趋升高,如何有效治理集体腐败成为当前反腐败亟待解决的突出问题。集体腐败的发展伴随着博弈过程,体现在集体腐败的生成、扩散以及分化各个阶段。笔者结合理论模型分析了以上博弈过程,以此探究集体腐败的演化机理,提出从腐败查处率、权力制约和监督、激励机制以及举报人保护制度等方面加强集体腐败治理。

关键词: 集体腐败, 博弈论, 腐败生成, 腐败分化, 预防腐败

Abstract: Collective corruption has become a prominent feature of corruption in China. The proportion of collective corruption in corruption cases investigated in recent years has been increasing. How to effectively manage collective corruption has become a prominent issue in China's current anti-corruption process. The development of collective corruption is accompanied by the game process, which is reflected in the stages of generation, diffusion and differentiation of collective corruption. Therefore, the author combined the theoretical model to analyze the above game process, gradually explored the evolution mechanism of collective corruption, and suggested to strengthen collective corruption governance from the aspects of corruption investigation rate, restriction and supervise of power, incentive mechanism and whistleblower protection system.

Key words: collective corruption, game theory, corruption generation, corruption differentiation, prevention of corruption

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