政府管制的法经济学解释:一个文献综述

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

从法经济学角度,政府管制是对法律的替代或补充。管制与法律的替代或补充理论包括政府直接管制与普通法体系效率论、控制社会无序的公共管制与法律理论以及法律的不完全性与政府管制理论三种,他们从处理市场失灵和维护社会秩序和正义的角度出发,认为管制和法律都是社会控制的方式,当法律不能够很好地解决这些问题时,管制和管制机构就被引入发挥作用。显然,这种政府管制理论在促使人们从更微观的原子层面理解政府管制的意义、作用和存在范围方面提供了新的洞见。这对于转轨期的中国反思法律体系的局限性、认识政府管制的正面作用、审视管制改革的方向和力度,具有重要的启示作用。

关键词: 政府管制理论, 政府管制, 法律, 启示

Abstract:

From the angle of Law and Economics, government regulation is a substitute or complement to law. Theories of substitute or complement of regulation to law consist of efficient theory of direct government versus law, theory of regulation and law to control social disorder and theory of incomplete law and government regulation. From the standpoint of restraining market failure and maintaining social order and justice, these theories indicate that government and law are all methods of social control. Once law can not cope with market failure and social disorder, regulation and regulatory body come into play. Evidently, this kind of theory of regulation gives a hint of wholly understanding regulation, which is an important revelation of effect of regulation. This can make us know limitation of legal system, rethink positive effect of regulation and consider direction and limit of reform of regulation.

Key words: theories of government regulation, government regulation, law, revelation

中图分类号:

D035

吴伟. 政府管制的法经济学解释:一个文献综述[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）, 2010, 23(6): 1-8.

WU Wei. An Explanation of Law and Economics of Government Regulation: A Literature Review[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF AERONAUTICS AND A, 2010, 23(6): 1-8.

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