Abstract: This paper posits a (a very British!) call to arms, and does so in five step. In part one, we address the need for constitutional fictions by which many surrender political power to the few in the name of stability, order and security. In part two, we show that conflict is both a necessary and a core principle of political constitutionalism:that it is the latent possibility of conflict, the (re)awakening of the many where the few abuse that power, that acts as the final check on government. In part three, we examine the recent re-interpretations of the work of Griffith by Tomkins and Ballamy, which reduced politics to its parliamentary form, thereby closing, rather than "enlarging", the "areas for argument and discussion":a narrow view of the constitution to which, admittedly, Griffith himself might have subscribed. In part four, we assess the approach needed if we are to remain in, or recover, constitutional health. Finally, in part five, we use the political and constitutional background to the devolution of political conflict, in extraordinary moments, to expose, break down and create new fictions.