ISSN 1008-2204
CN 11-3979/C
贾洪波, 杨昊雯. 流动人口养老保险治理现代化——中央、地方政府和用人单位三方博弈视角[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2021, 34(1): 50-61. DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2020.0520
引用本文: 贾洪波, 杨昊雯. 流动人口养老保险治理现代化——中央、地方政府和用人单位三方博弈视角[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2021, 34(1): 50-61. DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2020.0520
JIA Hongbo, YANG Haowen. Governance Modernization for Old-age Insurance of Floating Population: From Perspective of Game among the Central Government, Local Government and Employer[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2021, 34(1): 50-61. DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2020.0520
Citation: JIA Hongbo, YANG Haowen. Governance Modernization for Old-age Insurance of Floating Population: From Perspective of Game among the Central Government, Local Government and Employer[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2021, 34(1): 50-61. DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2020.0520

流动人口养老保险治理现代化——中央、地方政府和用人单位三方博弈视角

Governance Modernization for Old-age Insurance of Floating Population: From Perspective of Game among the Central Government, Local Government and Employer

  • 摘要: 相当一部分人口流动的地域范围超越了养老保险基金统筹层次所对应的行政区域,而属地化管理的养老保险制度对这一问题应对不力,从而造成了部分流动人口养老保险权益受损。流动人口养老保险权益受损的具体表现是部分流动人口养老保险参保率不高、养老保险关系转移接续不顺畅以及养老保险待遇偏低。中央政府、地方政府以及用人单位三者博弈形成的防共谋均衡对流动人口养老保险权益残缺提供了一个解释视角。构建并求解中央政府、地方政府与用人单位混合策略博弈,结果表明中央政府应该积极践行“放管服”改革、适当降低用人单位缴纳的养老保险费用、提升监管的有效性有利于打破流动人口养老保险权益保护中的防共谋均衡以推动流动人口养老保险治理现代化。

     

    Abstract: The considerable number of floating population exceeds the administrative regions corresponding to the pooling level of old-age insurance fund due to migration while the local management of old-age insurance system is ineffective in dealing with this problem, which results in the damage of old-age insurance rights of some floating population. The concrete manifestation of the loss of old-age insurance rights of part of floating population is low participation rate, difficult transfer and connection, and low benefit for old-age insurance. The coalition-proof equilibrium formed by the game among the central government, local government and employer provides an explanatory perspective for the incomplete old-age insurance rights of floating population. This paper develops and solves a mixed strategy game among central government, local government and employer, the results show that the central government should actively implement the reform of decentralization, regulation and service, appropriately reduce the old-age insurance expense paid by the employer, and improve the effectiveness of regulation, which is conducive to break the coalition-proof equilibrium in the protection of the old-age insurance rights of the floating population to enhance the governance modernization for old-age insurance of floating population.

     

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