北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2016, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (6): 67-72.DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2014.0661

• 经济与管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于信息生产的银企多阶段博弈分析

孙燕红, 张美菱   

  1. 中国科学技术大学 管理学院, 安徽 合肥 230026
  • 收稿日期:2014-12-23 出版日期:2016-11-25 发布日期:2016-08-24
  • 作者简介:孙燕红(1985-),女,安徽潜山人,副研究员,博士,研究方向为供应链管理、服务运作管理等.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101135)

On Multistage Game between Banks and Enterprises Based on Information Production

SUN Yanhong, ZHANG Meiling   

  1. School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei Anhui 230026, China
  • Received:2014-12-23 Online:2016-11-25 Published:2016-08-24

摘要:

中小企业是中国社会主义市场经济中重要的组成部分,是拉动中国经济增长的一个重要动力。但是与其贡献不相符的是,其占有的融资资源却不到1/4,中小企业融资难的问题仍然很严峻,关系型贷款最终应运而生。信息生产是影响关系型贷款能否顺利开展的关键因素,鉴于信息生产的重要性和关系型贷款的长期性,运用信号传递博弈模型对关系型贷款策略进行了研究,指出企业如何配合银行的信息生产以及银行如何根据企业的信号传递作出正确的预期,为中国发展关系型信贷提供新策略。

关键词: 关系型贷款, 信息生产, 软信息, 信号博弈, 声誉模型

Abstract:

Small and medium-sized enterprises take an important part in China's economy, a driving force for national economic growth. But their contribution does not match its share of financing resources, which takes less than 1/4. With the severe financing problem of SMEs, relationship lending eventually came into being. Information production is the key factor influencing the relationship lending. This paper uses the signaling game model to explore relationship lending strategy in view of the long-term importance and information production of relationship lending. The paper puts forward some suggestions on how the enterprises cooperate with the bank's information production and how the banks make the right strategies according to the signal transmission. The paper also provides new strategies for the development of relationship lending in China.

Key words: relationship lending, information production, soft information, signaling game, reputation model

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