Local Innovations in Reform and Integrity Building in China: Typological Analysis of Three Cases

doi:10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2014.0571

Abstract

Abstract:

This article focuses on institutional innovations of corruption governance by local governments in China. According to two dimensions: the degree of local creativity, and the impact on central strategies of anti-corruption, institutions created by the local governments can be categorized into three types: the institutions innovated by local government without any central demanding but accepted and diffused by central government; the institutions innovated by local government according to the demand of central government, and then promoted by the central government to national area; the institutions created by local government without being accepted by the central government, but automatically diffused among local governments.The main reasons for the influence of integrity innovation in different places is degree of central government encouraging local integrity innovation and reform,willingness of the key local leaders to integrity innovation,opposition from the local interests groups and public attitude feedback in the process of building integrity,which suggests that local power should come back to corruption governance policies.

Key words: China, anti-corruption, local government, institutional innovation, integrity building

CLC Number:

Li Hui. Local Innovations in Reform and Integrity Building in China: Typological Analysis of Three Cases[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF AERONAUTICS AND A, 2015, 28(4): 7-13.

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