JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF AERONAUTICS AND A ›› 2010, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (4): 44-47.

• 论文 • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Rational Expectations Equilibrium Analysis to Newsvendor Model with Updating Information

DU Bin1, QIU Wan-hua2   

  1. 1. School of Information Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China;;
    2. School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100191, China
  • Received:2009-03-02 Online:2010-08-20 Published:2010-10-14
  • Supported by:

    国家自然科学基金项目(70840004,70871002);江西省教育 厅科技项目(赣教技字(2007)278号)

Abstract:

Trading behavior in a game of buyers and sellers is not only a stochastic proces s, but also reflects the equilibrium of the existence and consistency. Based on a newsvendor model, the structure of information asymmetry commodity trading mar ket is designed and constructed. According to updating values of information, de finitions of two-stage rational expectation equilibrium are presented and prope rties on the equilibrium condition are analyzed. These findings reveal that payo ff of inventory level in rational expectations equilibrium is larger than in non equilibrium. Finally, a numerical example with normal demand function is analyze d to compute information value with updating information and verify the validity of the rational expectations equilibrium.

Key words: rational expectation equilibrium, newsvendor model, Bayesian forecasting, effort level

CLC Number: