Influence of Elite Governance Structure on Dividend

doi:10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2017.0280

Abstract

Abstract:

According to the problem of dividend of listed companies, a comparative study was used to examine the relationship between the dividend policy and elite governance via CSMAR financial research database about A shares and A+H shares in China from 2008 to 2015. The results showed that the higher the proportion of the first largest shareholder of A shares in the sample is, the more companies tend to pay cash dividend, which indicates that concentration of ownership helps to reduce costs of agency in favor of the payment of cash dividend in mainland China. The concurrent appointment of chairman and general manager of listed companies has no significant effect on dividend payment. The price mechanism of Chinese stock market encourages companies to issue more dividends, which helps to explain the phenomenon that A shares are relatively higher than "A + H" shares in the initiative of the largest shareholders in dividend payment. The low-growth companies tend to issue dividends in order to attract more investors. The research conclusions of corporate governance and dividend distribution have important policy implications for the current Chinese capital market.

Key words: elite governance, board structure, agency cost, dividend policy, price spillover

CLC Number:

F832.4

CHEN Yi, ZHANG Siyang. Influence of Elite Governance Structure on Dividend[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF AERONAUTICS AND A, 2019, 32(5): 83-89.

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