Equity Market Environment, Investors Activism and Corporate Governance Performance: An Analysis Based on Correlated Signal Model
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摘要: 将市场微观结构方法应用于所有权和控制权分离情形下的公司治理问题的研究，面向的实际运作环境是，投资者从事具有直接价值生产性的监督活动，其同时又利用通过监督活动获得的信息在股票市场中交易被监督公司的股权，借鉴Jain和Mirman的关联信号模型考察拥有大宗股权的投资者的公开市场交易对其内部监督控制行为的影响，得出了投资者的监督水平和公司治理绩效受到股票市场流动性等微观结构因素影响的结论，从而进一步揭示出投资者监督和控制有效运作的外部股权市场环境。Abstract: The paper applies market microstructure approach to study the problem of corporate governance on the case of separation of ownership and control power. Focus on the real operating environment where investors are engaged in monitoring activities with direct productive value, and meanwhile trading equity of the supervised company in the stock market, the paper adopts the Jain and Mirman's correlated signal model to examine the effect of open market transactions of investors with major stakes on their internal monitoring and control behavior. The paper concludes that the monitoring level of the investors and the corporate governance performance are affected by stock market microstructure factors such as stock market liquidity. The paper further reveals how to build an external equity market environment where investors can monitor and control more effectively.
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