Institutional Performance of Chinese Vertical Power Allocation from the Perspective of Intergovernmental Relations
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摘要: 纵向府际关系在中国国家治理体系中处于核心地位.改革开放以来,随着经济性分权、行政性分权的逐步推进,中国纵向府际关系形成了以政治集权、经济分权为基本特征的二元结构.从廉政建设、市场统一、社会稳定和政府创新四个维度分析了中国纵向府际权力配置的制度绩效,探讨了腐败、地方保护主义、"维稳怪圈"和政府创新乏力的府际关系制度根源,并认为未来应以权力的相互依赖为基础,构建法治化的纵向府际关系.Abstract: The Vertical Intergovernmental Relations (VIGRs) are the core of governance in China. Since the Reform and Opening in the late 1970s, Chinese VIGRs have become a dual structure of political centralization and economic decentralization, in the tide of devolution in the area of economic and administrative affairs. This paper discusses the institutional performance of Chinese vertical power allocation in four dimensions: anti-corruption, market integration, social stability and governmental innovation. It studies the system roots of corruptions, local protectionism, the paradox of stability maintenance and the lack of governmental innovations in contemporary China, and suggests that Chinese VIGRs should be legalized in future, on the basis of power inter-dependence.
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