ISSN 1008-2204
CN 11-3979/C

平台企业扼杀性并购的反垄断规制:困境与出路

Antitrust Regulation of Killer Acquisitions by Platform Enterprises: Dilemmas and Pathways

  • 摘要: 伴随数字经济的发展,平台企业异军突起,成为推动社会发展的重要力量。在网络效应的作用下,平台经济在较短的时间内形成了“赢家通吃”的局面,诸多经营领域被创立较早且实力雄厚的少数平台企业把控。为扩大市场力量,这些平台企业主导了以初创企业为潜在并购对象、以扼杀潜在竞争对手为动机、以数据垄断为手段的扼杀性并购。囿于制度缺陷,反垄断规制在应对平台企业扼杀性并购问题上存在申报标准、实质审查等诸多现实困境。对此,在现有规制工具出路上,应当调整经营者集中制度的适用基础和具体规则;在新型监管工具出路上,欧盟“守门人”制度提供了可供借鉴和参考的规制路径。

     

    Abstract: With the development of digital economy, platform enterprises have sprung up as a major force driving social development. Under network effects, the platform economy has quickly formed a winner-takes-all landscape in a short period of time, with many business areas dominated by a few early-established, powerful platforms. To expand market power, these platform enterprises have pursued killer acquisitions—targeting start-ups, motivated by stifling potential competitors, and employing data monopoly as the instrument. Due to the institutional defects, the antitrust regulation faces numerous practical difficulties in dealing with killer acquisitions by platform enterprises, such as declaration thresholds and substantive examination. In this regard, existing regulatory tools should be refined by the application basis and specific rules of the concentration of undertakings system ; for new regulatory tools, the EU "gatekeeper" system provides a viable regulatory path.

     

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