ISSN 1008-2204
CN 11-3979/C

碳税政策下的供应链微分博弈研究

Differential Game Study of Supply Chain under Carbon Tax Policy

  • 摘要: 在碳税政策下,假设消费者需求受上下游企业碳减排量和低碳宣传努力程度的共同影响,考虑到产品碳减排量受上游制造商减排努力程度影响的动态变化,构建了成本分担前后制造商和零售商长期联合减排与低碳宣传的两种Stackelberg微分博弈模型。结果表明,与没有碳税相比,碳税政策的实施能够从长期角度提高产品的碳减排量和零售商的利润,但会降低制造商的利润;此外,当碳税与上下游企业边际利润满足一定条件时,成本分担契约能够进一步提高产品的碳减排量,实现上下游企业利润的Pareto改善,并拓宽碳税的弹性空间。

     

    Abstract: Under the carbon tax policy, assuming that consumer demand is jointly influenced by upstream and downstream enterprises’ carbon emission reduction and low-carbon promotion efforts, two Stackelberg differential game models are constructed for the long-term joint emission reduction and low-carbon promotion of manufacturers and retailers before and after cost sharing, taking into account the dynamic changes of product carbon emission reduction influenced by upstream manufacturers’ emission reduction efforts. The results show that, compared with no carbon tax, the implementation of the carbon tax policy can improve the carbon emission reduction of products and retailers’ profits in the long run, but will reduce manufacturers’ profits; in addition, when the carbon tax and the marginal profits of upstream and downstream enterprises meet certain conditions, the cost-sharing contract can further improve the carbon emission reduction of products, realize the Pareto improvement of profits of upstream and downstream enterprises, and broaden the elasticity space of the carbon tax.

     

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