企业年金中的委托-代理风险研究

详细信息

On the Principal-agent Problem in the Enterprise Pension System

School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 43007 4, China

摘要: 企业年金涉及雇员、雇主、账户管理人、投资管理人等多方的利益。文章分析了在不同的管理模式下,企业年金各方所形成的双层委托-代理关系,剖析了企业年金委托-代理风险形成的原因,在此基础之上,提出了应对企业年金委托-代理风险的对策。
- 企业年金 /
- 委托-代理问题 /
- 激励机制 /
- 约束机制
Abstract: The enterprise pension involves several interested parties, such as employees, e oployers, treasurers and investment managers.The parties concerned are in contin ualcontract with one another, and thus form principal-agent relationships. This article focuses on the principal-agent problem in the enterprise pensi on system. Based on an analysis if the underlying cause of the problems the arti cle puts forward the strategies of coping with it.
- enterprise pension /
- principal-agent problem /
- incentive mechanism /
- res trictive mechanism

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