摘要:
长期以来,政策执行阻滞始终是困扰公共政策研究和实际政策执行的重要因素。文章引入信息经济学中"逆向选择"的概念和理论,基于博弈论的视角,将逆向选择、利益博弈与政策执行相结合,认为政策执行过程是一个典型的委托-代理模型,在信息不对称和激励不相容的条件下,政策执行主体和政策目标群体基于自身利益的博弈行为产生的逆向选择,将不可避免地影响政策的忠实执行,进而导致政策执行阻滞。在理论分析和理论结论的基础上,结合政策执行的特点,提出了防范政策执行逆向选择、改善政策执行阻滞的相应建议。
Abstract:
The retardance of policy implementation is an important factor which has perplex ed public policy research and policy implementation in practice for a long time. In this paper, the authors utilize the concept and theory of "adverse selectio n", which is a core concept in Information Economics, combine it with interest game and policy implementation, and form the perspective of Game Theory, so as t o analyse the problems in policy implementation. The paper draws the conclusion that the process of policy implementation is a classic model of principal-agent relationship. In the circumstance of information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility, there will be two kinds of adverse selections, which could be named policy implementation subject adverse selection and policy object adverse selection. The substance of these two kinds is interest game, and they will cont ribute to the retardance of policy implementation inevitably. Based on the above analysis, combining with the characteristics of policy implementation, this pap er gives some suggestion to keep away the adverse selection in policy implementa tion and make better the situation of retardance of policy implementation.
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