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规制俘获理论研究评述

李健

李健. 规制俘获理论研究评述[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2013, 26(1): 77-82.
引用本文: 李健. 规制俘获理论研究评述[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2013, 26(1): 77-82.
shu
Li Jian. Review of Regulatory Capture Theory[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2013, 26(1): 77-82.
Citation: Li Jian. Review of Regulatory Capture Theory[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2013, 26(1): 77-82.
shu

规制俘获理论研究评述

  • 清华大学 NGO研究所, 北京 100084

详细信息
    作者简介:

    李健(1981—),男,辽宁盘锦人,讲师,博士,研究方向为规制经济学.

  • 中图分类号: F091.3

Review of Regulatory Capture Theory

  • Institute of NGO, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

摘要

    摘要
  • 摘要: 在近年来规制俘获理论发展的主要特点的基础上,指出随着规制环境的变化,规制俘获研究开始呈现跨学科趋势,在管理学、法学、政治学、社会学与经济学之间规制俘获理论交叉、融合,发展出企业政治战略理论、规制的法律与经济分析、特殊利益政治学、规制社会资本理论等新的研究内容和领域。通过介绍这些领域的理论基础、研究范式和最新进展,指出跨学科研究丰富和完善了规制俘获理论,并最终使其向综合的科学理论方向发展。
    Abstract: The main characteristics of the development of regulatory capture in recent years are discussed here. It is pointed out that the study on regulatory capture is a kind of interdisciplinary research, and then is a new energetic field developed by crossing and syncretizing the regulatory capture with many related disciplines such as management, law, political science and sociology; in which the connotations, developments and trends of company political strategy, regulation legal form and economic theory, special interest groups, social capital of regulation are expatiated. It is indicated that the refinements of these disciplines imply the profound understanding of the human being on the regulatory capture. The interdiscipline will definitely follow the principles of the integrity and ultimately develop toward the establishment of the comprehensive theories for the regulatory capture.
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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2011-07-07
  • 发布日期:  2013-01-24

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