ISSN 1008-2204
CN 11-3979/C
高国柱, 高岚. 空间威慑到空间威胁:防止外空军备竞赛的规则解释与中国因应[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版. DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2023.0905
引用本文: 高国柱, 高岚. 空间威慑到空间威胁:防止外空军备竞赛的规则解释与中国因应[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版. DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2023.0905
GAO Guozhu, GAO Lan. From Space Deterrence to Space Threat: Rules’ Interpretation and China’s Response to PAROS[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition. DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2023.0905
Citation: GAO Guozhu, GAO Lan. From Space Deterrence to Space Threat: Rules’ Interpretation and China’s Response to PAROS[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition. DOI: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2023.0905

空间威慑到空间威胁:防止外空军备竞赛的规则解释与中国因应

From Space Deterrence to Space Threat: Rules’ Interpretation and China’s Response to PAROS

  • 摘要: 目前,外空军控规则的走向出现了明显分歧。一些国家提出所谓的“空间威胁”概念,意图推进“负责任外空行为准则”。威慑与威胁密切相关,没有威胁就没有威慑。当代国际法承认有限度威慑的合法性,也就意味着承认部分威胁的合法性。《联合国宪章》中的威胁主要是指“武力威胁”,如果适用于外空领域,必须对空间威胁的所有可能要素加以分析,包括主观(意图)、实施主体(是否可归结为国家)、行为表现(可衡量、可归因、可证明)、损害后果、因果关系等,换言之,需达到一定的门槛——必须具备诉诸武力的极大可能性。一些国家列举的所谓“空间威胁”具有选择性和针对性,存在着覆盖不全和依赖主观判断的缺陷,依照现有国际法进行解释,这些所谓的“空间威胁”不能被确认为国际不法行为。当代国际外空军控规则是大国奉行威慑战略下彼此达成妥协的结果,如果无视这一历史趋势,强行推进有利于某些国家保持太空军事优势的规则,必然会破坏战略稳定与平衡,最终严重损害国际社会防止外空军备竞赛的集体努力。

     

    Abstract: Currently, there exists a notable divergence in the developing trend of rules on outer space arms control. Some nations put forward the notion of “space threat” in an effort to promote the program of “Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors”. Deterrence and threat are closely related, as there can be no deterrence without threat. Contemporary international law recognizes the legitimacy of limited deterrence, which means that it also acknowledges the legitimacy of some threats. The term “threat” in the Chart of the United Nations primarily refers to “threat of force”. If this definition applies to the context of outer space, it becomes necessary to analyze all potential elements of space threats, including the subjectivity (intention), the actor (whether it can be attributed to a state), the act (measurable, attributable and demonstrable), the resulting damages, and the causation, etc.. In other words, a certain threshold needs to be met---there must be a high probability of resorting to force. The so-called “space threats” cited by some States are selective and targeted in nature, with the deficiencies of incomplete coverage and reliance on subjective judgment. When interpreted within the framework of existing international law, these so-called “space threats” cannot be recognized as internationally wrongful acts. Contemporary international rules on outer space arms control are the result of compromises reached by major powers under their deterrence strategies. Neglecting this historical trend and promoting rules that favor certain States’ military dominance in outer space would undoubtedly undermine strategic stability and equilibrium, and ultimately severely impede the collective efforts of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer space.

     

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