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负债融资、代理冲突与企业投资决策研究

郭 健, 魏法杰

郭 健, 魏法杰. 负债融资、代理冲突与企业投资决策研究[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2008, 21(4): 8-12.
引用本文: 郭 健, 魏法杰. 负债融资、代理冲突与企业投资决策研究[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2008, 21(4): 8-12.
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GUO Jian, WEI Fa-. Research on Debt Financing, Agency Conflicts and Enterprise Investment Decisions[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2008, 21(4): 8-12.
Citation: GUO Jian, WEI Fa-. Research on Debt Financing, Agency Conflicts and Enterprise Investment Decisions[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2008, 21(4): 8-12.
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负债融资、代理冲突与企业投资决策研究

  • 北京航空航天大学 经济管理学院, 北京 100191

详细信息

  • 中图分类号: F830.59

Research on Debt Financing, Agency Conflicts and Enterprise Investment Decisions

  • School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100191, China

摘要

    摘要
  • 摘要: 采用实物期权方法,研究了股东债权人代理冲突下负债融资对企业投资行为的影响,并进 一步分析了负债融资约束下的投资决策问题。数值计算显示,与无负债企业相比,杠杆企业 具有过度投资倾向以加快实现负债融资所带来的利息税盾价值;与企业价值最大化策略相比 ,在股东权益最大化目标下,股东具有较早执行投资期权的动机,影响投资期权价值和最优 财务杠杆的选择,并侵害了债权人的利益。当存在负债融资约束时,投资临界点表现出先下 降后上升的趋势。
    Abstract: This paper examines the impact of debt finance over the enterprise investment be havior using the real option method under stockholder-bondholder conflicts and debt constraint on the investment trigger. Numerical solutions show that stockho lders choose to exercise the investment option too early compared to the unlevel ed enterprise. Compared with value-maximizing policy, stockholders are inclined to overinvestment under the equity-maximizing investment policy, which affects the investment option value and optimal leverage choice, and does harm to the interests of bondholders. When debt constrained, the enterprise decreases the investment trigger first, and then increases it as constraints become more binding.
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    • 参考文献(12)
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    [10] 李强,曾勇. 不确定环境下企业技术创新投融资决策研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2005,(3):32-38.
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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2007-07-22
  • 发布日期:  2008-12-24

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