ISSN 1008-2204
CN 11-3979/C
黄 瑞. 企业年金中的委托-代理风险研究[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2006, 19(3): 24-27.
引用本文: 黄 瑞. 企业年金中的委托-代理风险研究[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2006, 19(3): 24-27.
HUANG Rui. On the Principal-agent Problem in the Enterprise Pension System[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2006, 19(3): 24-27.
Citation: HUANG Rui. On the Principal-agent Problem in the Enterprise Pension System[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2006, 19(3): 24-27.

企业年金中的委托-代理风险研究

On the Principal-agent Problem in the Enterprise Pension System

  • 摘要: 企业年金涉及雇员、雇主、账户管理人、投资管理人等多方的利益。文章分析了在不同的管理模式下,企业年金各方所形成的双层委托-代理关系,剖析了企业年金委托-代理风险形成的原因,在此基础之上,提出了应对企业年金委托-代理风险的对策。

     

    Abstract: The enterprise pension involves several interested parties, such as employees, e oployers, treasurers and investment managers.The parties concerned are in contin ualcontract with one another, and thus form principal-agent relationships. This article focuses on the principal-agent problem in the enterprise pensi on system. Based on an analysis if the underlying cause of the problems the arti cle puts forward the strategies of coping with it.

     

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