ISSN 1008-2204
CN 11-3979/C
曹文宏. 理性怀疑:政府信任改善的压力机制[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2010, 23(3): 6-10.
引用本文: 曹文宏. 理性怀疑:政府信任改善的压力机制[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报社会科学版, 2010, 23(3): 6-10.
CAO Wen-hong. Rational Skepticism: The Pressure Mechanism to Improve Government Trust[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2010, 23(3): 6-10.
Citation: CAO Wen-hong. Rational Skepticism: The Pressure Mechanism to Improve Government Trust[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2010, 23(3): 6-10.

理性怀疑:政府信任改善的压力机制

Rational Skepticism: The Pressure Mechanism to Improve Government Trust

  • 摘要: 政府信任危机已成为一种国际现象,如何改善政府信任也就成为各国政界和学界共同关注的 问题。由于受既定的主客体二元思维模式的制约,过多地强调通过政府的自身有为来改善政 府信任,其实际效果差强人意,为此,必须突破传统思维定势,转换研究路径。政府信任应 当是政府与公众处于平等地位,由二者互动而生成。因此,政府信任的改善不仅需要政府有 为,更需要公众自觉。在缺乏理性怀疑和批判精神的中国,公众自觉就是要让公众对政府保 持理性怀疑,并使之成为改善政府信任的压力机制。这既要求在理论上作出剖析,更应该在 实践中进行探索。

     

    Abstract: The crisis of government trust has become an international phenomenon. Thus, how to improve government trust is a common problem that is focused on by the polit ical and academic circles of every country. Because of the restriction of the fi xed thinking pattern of host-guest duality, we tend to emphasize excessively th at we can improve the government trust through government itself, but the actual result has not been so satisfactory. We need to break through the traditional t hinking set and change our research approach. Government trust should be that th e government and the public are of equal status, resulting from the interaction of each other. Therefore, improving the government trust not only needs the gove rnment’s promising, but also the public’s self-awareness. In the background o f a lack of rational skepticism and critical spirit in China, the public’s self -awareness is to let the public hold a rational skepticism of the government, a nd make it become the pressure mechanism. So we should not only make an analysis in theory, but go in for exploration in practice.

     

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