Local Government's Safety Supervision of Chemical Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Model: A Case Study of "3·21" Explosion Accident of Jiangsu Province

The new normal of economic development not only increases the pain of enterprise transformation, but also brings about the dynamic imbalance of government safety supervision. This leads to low efficiency of supervision and frequent occurrence of major accidents, affecting social stability and government credibility. This study gives a case study of the regulatory failure of Xiangshui "3·21" chemical explosion accident in Jiangsu province. Based on the assumption of rational behavior, using the evolutionary game model and the interest analysis method, a multi-dimensional dynamic analysis is conducted on the value choice and game tactics faced by the government and enterprises from the introduction stage to the operation and development stage and then to the post-accident stage of an investment project. The research finds that in the new normal, enterprises are faced with the dilemma of rising costs and declining benefits. Targeted towards profits, enterprises tend to speculate in pursuit of excess returns in the lax supervision of regulatory authorities, so they will choose negative tactics to avoid supervision. Due to multiple interests consideration, local governments will maintain the bottom-line frequency and intensity of supervision, and take the strategy of lax supervision, which leads to a mere formality of supervision in the dynamic game process. Therefore, the government should base its game strategies for safety regulation on reconstruction of cost-benefit balance.