Multi-Agent Strategy Behavior of Swift Response to Public Complaints in Mega-City Township Field: Internal Mechanism and Dilemma Relief

Swift response to public complaints is an important policy for improving the social governance pattern of “collaboration, participation, and shared benefits”. However, in the practice of receiving and handling complaints in mega-city townships, the complexity of the social structure, the plurality of interests and the diversity of governance scenarios have led to the frequent occurrence of strategic behavior from multi-governance subjects. By constructing a “structure-process” analytical framework in the field of mega-city townships, this paper analyzed the operational logic of structural coupling, process debugging, and inter-construction and interdependence in the context of swift response to public complaints. Based on a case study of Town Z in Beijing, it explored three deep-rooted reasons of strategy behavior of swift response to public complaints: “rationalization of demands + negative evaluation” strategy behavior of the requester, “risk avoidance + informal and simplified governance” strategy behavior of the township government, and the “flexible consultation + passive execution” strategy behavior of the village committee. Furthermore, this paper proposed several suggestions like configuration of structural elements, process integration optimization and “structure-process” coordinated governance to alleviate the dilemma from the double-edged effect of the multi-agent strategy behavior of swift response to public complaints. This paper provides theoretical support for solving the practical difficulties in grassroots governance in China.