Multi-Agent Strategy Behavior of Swift Responses to Public Complaints in the Field of Mega-City Township: Internal Mechanisms and Dilemma Relief

The swift response to public complaints is an important policy on improving the social governance pattern of “collaboration, participation, and shared benefits”. However, in the practice of receiving and handling public complaints in mega-city townships, the complexity of the social structure, the diversity of interest demand, and the variety of governance scenarios have led to the frequent occurrence of the strategy behavior. By constructing a “structure-process” analytical framework in the field of mega-city townships, this study analyzes the operational logic of structural coupling, process debugging, and inter-construction and interdependence in the context of swift responses to public complaints. Based on a case study of Town Z in Beijing, it explores three underlying motivations behind the strategy behavior of swift response to public complaints, inlcuding “rationalization of demands + negative evaluation” strategy behavior of the claimant, “risk avoidance + informal and simplified governance” strategy behavior of the township government, and the “flexible consultation + passive execution” strategy behavior of the village committee. Finally, this paper proposes configuration of structural elements, optimization of process integration and “structure-process” coordinated governance, the dilemma caused by the double-edged effect of the multi-agent strategy behavior of swift responses to public complaints can be alleviated. This paper provides theoretical support for the resolution of practical issues in China’s primary-level governance.