ISSN 1008-2204
CN 11-3979/C
Fan Shiqian. The Relationship between SASAC and Boards of Directors in Wholely State-owned Corporations[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2012, 25(4): 33-39.
Citation: Fan Shiqian. The Relationship between SASAC and Boards of Directors in Wholely State-owned Corporations[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2012, 25(4): 33-39.

The Relationship between SASAC and Boards of Directors in Wholely State-owned Corporations

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  • Received Date: December 21, 2011
  • Published Date: July 24, 2012
  • In economics, the theory of relationship between general meetings of shareholders and committee of directors is generally described under the title of relationship between shareholders and directors,which includes enterpriser theory and agency theory. Enterpriser theory considers that shareholder's equity and director's management are both functions split from ownership.Agency theory thinks that a shareholder is a principal and a director is an agent.In a sense,enterpriser theory discloses deeper character of relationship between shareholders and directors.In jurisprudence there are mainly five theories about this area, namely principal-agency theory, deputy theory, trust theory, double relationship theory and legal relationship theory. In essence, corporations are complicated organizations and differ in type and scale, thus the relationships between shareholders and directors in different corporations are different accordingly. Any single theory can hardly describe all such relationships precisely.The relationship between State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council(SASAC) and wholely state-owned corporations is similar to that in stock corporations, especially like that in listed corporations. Regulations should explicitly prescribe that legal rights of SASAC are smaller in scope than that of shareholders in any other corporations.
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