Large Shareholder Control, Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance：Empirical Evidence from the Private Listed Companies in China

Wang Qi; Wu Chong

Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition > 2013 > 26(6): 80-85.

Wang Qi, Wu Chong. Large Shareholder Control, Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance：Empirical Evidence from the Private Listed Companies in China[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Social Sciences Edition, 2013, 26(6): 80-85.

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Large Shareholder Control, Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance：Empirical Evidence from the Private Listed Companies in China

Wang Qi,
Wu Chong

School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China

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Received Date: April 26, 2013
Published Date: November 24, 2013

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This paper researches the relation between executive compensation and corporate performance from the perspective of large shareholder by taking 2009—2011 private listed companies as the sample, then studies the incentive effect and entrenchment effect of large shareholder control on the incentive effects of executive compensation. Our results show that the greater the proportion of internal executives, the smaller the impact of executive compensation to corporate performance; the larger the largest shareholding ratio, the greater the impact of executive compensation to corporate performance. Further we found that the large shareholder control relates with the incentive effects of executive compensation, and has the incentive effect and entrenchment effect.
- large shareholder control,
- executive compensation,
- corporate performance,
- the private listed companies

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