Citation: | LIU H T,LIU J X,LI D X,et al. Verification scheme of position message for automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast system based on interval difference of arrival[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,2024,50(9):2696-2703 (in Chinese) doi: 10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2022.0729 |
Because of its precise aircraft position, quick update interval, and broad surveillance coverage, automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a rapidly developing aeronautical surveillance system that has been extensively utilized in civil aviation surveillance. Nevertheless, since ADS-B communications are transmitted without cryptographic security protections, ADS-B is susceptible to spoofing sources. To detect spoofing, a verification scheme of ADS-B position messagesbased on interval difference of arrival (IDOA) is proposed. Firstly, the system model of ADS-B position message verification based on IDOA is presented.Then, the expression of the test statistic for ADS-B position message verification is derived. In addition, the detection threshold is given by the derived statistical property of the test statistic. Finally, computer simulation is used to confirm the accuracy and efficacy of the suggested strategy.The simulation results show that the probability of detection and probability of false of the IDOA scheme is equivalent to that of the time difference of arrival (TDOA) scheme,and IDOA is not sensitive to time measurement error and ADS-B position error. However, the benefit of IDOA is that it is not affected by time synchronization errors.
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