Volume 32 Issue 10
Oct.  2006
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Qiu Wanhua, Yu Dongping. Option games model of firm′s investment strategy in oligopoly[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2006, 32(10): 1220-1225. (in Chinese)
Citation: Qiu Wanhua, Yu Dongping. Option games model of firm′s investment strategy in oligopoly[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2006, 32(10): 1220-1225. (in Chinese)

Option games model of firm′s investment strategy in oligopoly

  • Received Date: 11 May 2006
  • Publish Date: 31 Oct 2006
  • The firm′s investment strategy was examined in oligopoly and the firm′s optimal equilibrium exercise strategy of real options was analyzed systemicallyunder incomplete competition. The research shows that there are three equilibriums, such as preemption, sequence and simultaneous investment, when existing negative externalities, However, there is just simultaneous investment equilibrium, when positive externalities. The firm′s value and optimal investment threshold increase with the raise of market uncertainty. Competitive interaction accelerates investment, furthermore the threshold is between monopolistic investment threshold and Marshallian investment tlhreshold, even though the firm number is infinite.

     

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