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基于改进前景理论的航空货运联盟博弈分析

闫妍 张锦 唐秋宇

闫妍, 张锦, 唐秋宇等 . 基于改进前景理论的航空货运联盟博弈分析[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报, 2020, 46(7): 1247-1257. doi: 10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2019.0468
引用本文: 闫妍, 张锦, 唐秋宇等 . 基于改进前景理论的航空货运联盟博弈分析[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报, 2020, 46(7): 1247-1257. doi: 10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2019.0468
YAN Yan, ZHANG Jin, TANG Qiuyuet al. Game analysis of airline freight alliance based on improved prospect theory[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2020, 46(7): 1247-1257. doi: 10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2019.0468(in Chinese)
Citation: YAN Yan, ZHANG Jin, TANG Qiuyuet al. Game analysis of airline freight alliance based on improved prospect theory[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2020, 46(7): 1247-1257. doi: 10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2019.0468(in Chinese)

基于改进前景理论的航空货运联盟博弈分析

doi: 10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2019.0468
基金项目: 

国家社会科学基金 17XGL013

详细信息
    作者简介:

    闫妍 女, 博士研究生。主要研究方向:航空物流网络系统优化与设计

    张锦 男,博士,教授,博士生导师。主要研究方向:物流系统规划与优化、供应链管理

    唐秋宇 女, 硕士研究生。主要研究方向:综合交通物流网络系统优化

    通讯作者:

    张锦. E-mail:zhjswjtu@home.swjtu.edu.cn

  • 中图分类号: F062.9;V2-9

Game analysis of airline freight alliance based on improved prospect theory

Funds: 

National Social Science Fund of China 17XGL013

More Information
  • 摘要:

    航空货运联盟的应用有助于航空公司的业务经营,航空公司通过低运营成本,提高服务质量,使得用户获得较大的满足感。以航空货运联盟为基础,探讨不同航空公司在航空货运联盟中有关航线运输业务自营或外包的决策问题。考虑前景理论中的损失厌恶,采用改进的风险价值函数刻画航空公司的成本损失;建立得益矩阵,并通过动态演化博弈分析决策过程。结果表明:当自营成本分摊系数越大,外包成本分摊系数、风险损失系数和风险凹凸系数越小,固定成本越大,飞机的单位运输成本越小,收益率越大时,S航空公司若货运量大于其他航空公司,则宜采取业务自营,反之,则业务外包;当自营成本分摊系数越小,外包成本分摊系数越大时,S航空公司选择自营概率越大;当S航空公司货运量越大时,其选择自营概率越大;其他航空公司自营概率越大,S航空公司自营概率越小。

     

  • 图 1  风险价值函数

    Figure 1.  Var function

    图 2  演化博弈过程

    Figure 2.  Evolutionary game process

    图 3  其他航空公司货运量对选择概率的影响(低运量)

    Figure 3.  Influence of freight volume of other airlines on selection probability under low traffic volume

    图 4  自营成本分摊系数对选择概率的影响(低运量)

    Figure 4.  Influence of self-operating cost allocation coefficient on selection probability under low traffic volume

    图 5  外包成本分摊系数对选择概率的影响(低运量)

    Figure 5.  Influence of outsourcing cost allocation coefficient on selection probability under low traffic volume

    图 6  其他航空公司货运量对选择概率的影响(高运量)

    Figure 6.  Influence of freight volume of other airlines on selection probability under high traffic volume

    图 7  自营成本分摊系数对选择概率的影响(高运量)

    Figure 7.  Influence of self-operating cost allocation coefficient on selection probability under high traffic volume

    图 8  外包成本分摊系数对选择概率的影响(高运量)

    Figure 8.  Influence of outsourcing cost allocation coefficient on selection probability under high traffic volume

    表  1  S航空公司与其他航空公司博弈的得益矩阵

    Table  1.   Game benefit matrix of S airline and other airlines

    其他航空公司 S航空公司
    运输业务自营 运输业务外包
    运输业务自营
    运输业务外包 (A7, A8)
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  2  五个均衡点的局部稳定性分析

    Table  2.   Local stability analysis of five equilibrium points

    均衡点 行列式符号 迹符号 局部稳定性
    A(0, 0) + + 不稳定
    B(1, 0) + - ESS
    C(0, 1) + - ESS
    D(1, 1) + + 不稳定
    E(a, b) - 0 鞍点
    注:a=[A8+CP-(t-α)CTdD2]/{A8-A4-[t+(1-β-α)]·CTdD2}, b=[A7+CP-(t-α)CTdD1]/{A7-A5-[t+(1-β-α)]CTdD1}。
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  3  不同情形下的均衡点

    Table  3.   Equilibrium points under different conditions

    固定参数 变动参数 E 演化方向
    D1=10 t
    D2=20 t
    α=0.6
    β=1.1 (0.8474,0.647 3) (0,1)
    β=1.2 (0.889 7,0.679 7)
    β=1.3 (0.936 5,0.715 4)
    β=1.4 (0.988 4,0.755 0)
    D1=10 t
    D2=20 t
    β=1.4
    α=0.1 (0.990 9,0.808 2) (1,0)
    α=0.3 (0.990 1,0.790 0)
    α=0.5 (0.989 0,0.767 9)
    α=0.7 (0.987 7,0.740 7)
    α=0.9 (0.986 1,0.706 1)
    D1=10 t
    α=0.6
    β=1.4
    D2=5 t (0.275 0,0.608 3) (0,1)
    D2=10 t (0.702 4,0.658 4)
    D2=15 t (0.867 3,0.712 0) (1,0)
    D2=20 t (0.988 4,0.755 0)
    D2=20 t
    α=0.6
    β=1.4
    D1=5 t (0.949 0,0.275 3) (0,1)
    D1=10 t (0.988 4,0.755 0)
    D1=20 t 不在范围内
    D1=25 t
    下载: 导出CSV
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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2019-09-02
  • 录用日期:  2020-01-03
  • 刊出日期:  2020-07-20

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