无偿服务非营利组织中的委托-代理关系

详细信息

Principal-Agent Relation in the Organization for Gratuitous Services

School of Public Administration, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100083, China

摘要: 通常认为,由于不存在利润激励,无偿服务非营利组织中将存在着严重的激励问题。但是大量事实证明,无偿服务非营利组织往往有着与营利性组织同样的运行效率,这说明利润以外的激励因素有着格外重要的意义。"产出门槛值监督"和"自我激励"是无偿服务非营利组织中的主要激励方式。文章利用委托-代理模型研究了这两种机制的激励效果,指出"长期利益"和"利他主义"可以对代理人产生较强的当期激励,但不确定性的存在将削弱激励效果。
- 非营利 /
- 委托-代理 /
- 激励
Abstract: Because there is no profit incentive, the organizations for gratuitous services are generally considered having serious incentive difficulty, but most of which have the same efficiency as for-profit-enterprises. This implied that, except profits, many other incentive mechanisms are also important. "Output benchmark" and "self-incentive" are main incentives in the organizations for gratuitous services. The paper analyzes these two incentive mechanisms using principal-agent model and indicates that "the long term benefit" and "altruism" can produce strong incentive to the agents, but the existence of the uncertainty weakens their incentive effects.
- non-profit /
- principal-agent /
- incentives entrust

[1]	Hansmann H. The Role of the Non-Profit Enterprise[J]. Yale Law Journal,1980, (89):835-901.
[2]	Weisbrod B. The Nonprofit Economy[M]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1988.202-245.
[3]	Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Altruism, Non-profits, and Economic Theory[J], Journal of Economics Literature,1996, (34):701-728.