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Volume 24 Issue 1
Jan.  1998
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Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics  > 1998  >  24(1): 68-70.
Tian Kelu, Hui Yimin. Decision Problem in the Context of Delegated Implementation[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1998, 24(1): 68-70. (in Chinese)
Citation: Tian Kelu, Hui Yimin. Decision Problem in the Context of Delegated Implementation[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1998, 24(1): 68-70. (in Chinese)
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Decision Problem in the Context of Delegated Implementation

  • Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,School of Management

  • Received Date: 05 Jun 1996
  • Publish Date: 31 Jan 1998
    Abstract
  • With analytic tools from agency theory,the decision problem in the context of delegated implementation is analyzed.First,assumptions about the specific context of the problem are made in compliance with agency theory,on the basis of which a general model is built.Then,the general model is decomposed into two correlated sub-problems:one is a pure-implementation problem,and the other is a decision problem.By doing so,the essence of the problem is observed directly. Later,attempts are made to further simplify the problem by trying to separate the n-agent-pure-implementation problem into n single-agent-pure-implementation problems; the possibilities of doing this and the relationship between these two kinds of problems are analyzed.Finally,possible research lines are directed in conclusion.

     

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