北京航空航天大学学报 ›› 2006, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (05): 536-539.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

我国航空军品定价体制下的博弈及效率分析

高远洋, 钱勇刚, 王文杰   

  1. 北京航空航天大学 经济管理学院, 北京 100083
  • 收稿日期:2005-04-25 出版日期:2006-05-31 发布日期:2010-09-20
  • 作者简介:高远洋(1963-), 男, 贵州绥阳人, 副教授,gyy@vip.sina.com.
  • 基金资助:

    航空基础科学基金资助项目(03J51053)

Game behaviors and efficiency analysis under Chinese pricing system of military aviation products

Gao Yuanyang, Qian Yonggang, Wang Wenjie   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100083, China
  • Received:2005-04-25 Online:2006-05-31 Published:2010-09-20

摘要: 根据我国航空军品现行的定价体制及定价过程,构建了一个抽象化的分析模型,以描述及分析现行成本加成定价体制下,市场参与各方的博弈行为及其对效率的影响.研究结果表明,在现行的成本加成定价体制下,制造企业有充分的动机虚增生产成本;上游企业的成本虚增不仅给本企业带来了好处,也为下游企业带来了利润贡献,下游企业有充分的动机去纵容上游企业的成本虚增行为;越是上游的企业其成本虚增行为对最终产品价格的影响效应就越大.针对发现的问题,最后提出了相应的政策性改善建议.

Abstract: According to the current pricing system and procedure of military aviation product in China, a theoretical analysis model was built, which was used to describe and analyse the game behaviors of players in the market and their effects on efficiency under the current pricing system based on cost. The research results show that under current pricing system, manufacturers have motivation to exaggerate their cost. The cost exaggerating behaviors of upriver manufacturers not only brought themselves the benefits, but also brought the profit contributions to downriver manufactures, which have motivation to connivance such behaviors of upriver manufacturers. The cost exaggerating behavior of upriver manufacturer has greater influence on the price of final product than downriver manufacture’s. Some suggestions were proposed to deal with these problems and improve the current pricing system.

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