Option games model of firm′s investment strategy in oligopoly
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摘要: 研究了寡头垄断企业战略投资决策行为,系统分析了不完全竞争环境下最优实物期权执行战略均衡规则.研究表明:负的外部性下存在抢先/序贯和同时投资3类均衡,而正的外部性下只存在同时投资均衡;企业价值和最优投资临界值都随市场不确定性增大而增大;竞争互动加速了企业投资,甚至当企业数目趋于无穷大的时候,其投资临界值位于垄断与马歇尔投资临界值之间.Abstract: The firm′s investment strategy was examined in oligopoly and the firm′s optimal equilibrium exercise strategy of real options was analyzed systemicallyunder incomplete competition. The research shows that there are three equilibriums, such as preemption, sequence and simultaneous investment, when existing negative externalities, However, there is just simultaneous investment equilibrium, when positive externalities. The firm′s value and optimal investment threshold increase with the raise of market uncertainty. Competitive interaction accelerates investment, furthermore the threshold is between monopolistic investment threshold and Marshallian investment tlhreshold, even though the firm number is infinite.
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Key words:
- investment decision /
- real options /
- option games /
- oligopoly
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