基于TESLA协议的BDSBAS电文认证技术

陈潇; 田翔; 罗瑞丹; 刘婷; 宋佳慧; 吴海涛

doi:10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2021.0669

基于TESLA协议的BDSBAS电文认证技术

doi: 10.13700/j.bh.1001-5965.2021.0669

陈潇^{1, 2},
田翔²,
罗瑞丹¹,
刘婷^1, ,,
宋佳慧^{1, 2},
吴海涛¹

1.
中国科学院空天信息创新研究院，北京 100094
2.
中国科学院大学电子电气与通信工程学院，北京 100049

详细信息

通讯作者:
E-mail：liuting101015@aircas.ac.cn

中图分类号: V19；X949
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2021-11-05
- 录用日期: 2022-03-27
- 网络出版日期: 2022-04-08
- 整期出版日期: 2023-10-01

Design of message authentication based on TESLA protocol for BDSBAS

CHEN Xiao^{1, 2},
TIAN Xiang²,
LUO Ruidan¹,
LIU Ting^{1
, ,},
SONG Jiahui^{1, 2},
WU Haitao¹

1.
Aerospace Information Research Institute，Chinese Academy of Sciences，Beijing 100094，China
2.
School of Electronic，Electrical and Communication Engineering，University of Chinese Academy of Sciences，Beijing 100049，China

More Information

Corresponding author: E-mail：liuting101015@aircas.ac.cn

摘要

摘要:
星基增强系统（SBAS）能为航空、航海等生命安全领域提供完好性增强服务，针对SBAS服务的欺骗风险，面向北斗星基增强系统（BDSBAS）发展，提出基于中国商用密码标准算法的时间效应流丢失容错认证机制（TESLA）电文认证方案。阐述SBAS电文认证架构与TESLA认证原理，开展基于中国商用密码标准算法的BDSABS认证电文编排及空中密钥更新（OTAR）的电文播发设计，针对L5I与L5Q开展认证时间间隔和最大认证延迟等指标的理论分析，进一步从OTAR信息权重和解调错误率2方面仿真首次认证时间指标。仿真结果能为基于TESLA协议的BDSBAS电文认证提供一定的理论支持。
- 北斗星基增强系统 /
- 电文认证 /
- 消息认证码 /
- 时间效应流丢失容错认证机制 /
- 空中密钥更新
Abstract:
Aviation, navigation, and other life safety areas can benefit from the integrity augmentation services offered by SBAS. In response to the deception risk of SBAS services and the development of the BeiDou satellite-based augmentation system (BDSBAS), this paper proposes a message authentication method based on the timed efficient streaming loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA) protocol. Firstly, this article introduces SBAS service security risks and the concept of message authentication and then explains the principle of TESLA, key chain generation, and operation process. The Over the Air Rekeying (OTAR) message broadcast design and authentication message format are created in accordance with the domestic commercial cryptographic standard hash algorithm. Finally, a simulation test is carried out for the L5I channel and the L5Q channel. The simulation results can provide theoretical support for the BDSBAS authentication based on the TESLA scheme.

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图 1 加入电文认证后的SBAS系统构架

Figure 1. SBAS architecture after adding authentication

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图 2 基于TESLA的电文认证原理图

Figure 2. Message authentication principle of TESLA

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图 3 TESLA电文结构

Figure 3. TESLA message structure

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图 4 L5I TESLA电文结构

Figure 4. L5I TESLA message structure

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图 5 L5Q TESLA电文结构

Figure 5. L5Q TESLA message structure

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图 6 OTAR电文结构

Figure 6. OTAR message structure

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图 7 TESLA-I最大认证延迟和认证时间间隔

Figure 7. MAL and TBA of TESLA-I

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图 8 TESLA-Q最大认证延迟和认证时间间隔

Figure 8. MAL and TBA of TESLA-Q

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图 9 TESLA-I权重比影响分析

Figure 9. Impact analysis of weight ratio of TESLA-I

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图 10 TESLA-Q权重比影响分析

Figure 10. Impact analysis of weight ratio of TESLA-Q

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图 11 TESLA-I帧错误率影响分析

Figure 11. PER analysis of TESLA-I

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图 12 TESLA-Q帧错误率影响分析

Figure 12. PER analysis of TESLA-Q

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表 1 TESLA OTAR播发电文类型

Table 1. TESLA OTAR message type

OTAR播发电文类型	定义	长度/bit
OMT1	当前盐值、密钥链的根密钥或中间密钥	30+115
OMT2	当前盐值和根密钥的数字签名	512
OMT3	当前系统公钥	512
OMT4	当前系统公钥的CA数字签名	512
OMT5	当前盐值/密钥链/系统公钥/ 认证机构公钥到期声明	48
OMT6	到期声明的CA数字签名	512
OMT7	下一个盐值、密钥链的根密钥或中间密钥	30+115
OMT8	下一个盐值和根密钥或者中间密钥的数字签名	512
OMT9	下一个系统公钥	512
OMT10	下一个系统公钥的CA数字签名	512
OMT11	下一个认证机构公钥的3项签名证书	512*3

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表 2 TESLA-I权重比对比结果

Table 2. Comparison results of weight ratio for TESLA-I

W₁/W_r	t_ave/s	t_max/s	t_min/s	T_ave/s
10⁰	235.5	552	54	873.4
10¹	161.2	384	54	1688.2
10²	138.3	378	54	3973.5
10³	132.7	330	54	11505.7
10⁴	131.5	252	54	32457.2

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表 3 TESLA-Q权重比对比结果

Table 3. Comparison results of weight ratio for TESLA-Q

W₁/W_r	t_ave/s	t_max/s	t_min/s	T_ave/s
10⁰	39.2	92	9	145.6
10¹	26.9	64	9	281.3
10²	23.1	63	9	662.2
10³	22.1	55	9	1917.6
10⁴	21.9	42	9	5409.5

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表 4 TESLA-I帧错误率对比结果

Table 4. Comparison results of TESLA-I PER

PER	t_ave/s	t_max/s	t_min/s	T_ave/s
10⁻¹	239.7	1056	54	6553.5
10⁻²	150.7	594	54	5004.1
10⁻³	139.5	498	54	3986.3
10⁻⁴	139.0	384	54	3985.6
10⁻⁵	139.2	360	54	3979.3

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表 5 TESLA-Q帧错误率对比结果

Table 5. Comparison results of TESLA-Q PER

PER	t_ave/s	t_max/s	t_min/s	T_ave/s
10⁻¹	40.6	164	9	1087.3
10⁻²	25.1	98	9	828.1
10⁻³	23.3	74	9	663.3
10⁻⁴	23.2	65	9	663.4
10⁻⁵	23.2	60	9	663.8

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表 6 基于ECDSA和TESLA方案的TBA和MAL指标

Table 6. TBA and MAL indicators based ECDSA and TESLA soulution

方案	认证方式	数字签名长度/bit	密钥	长度/bit	TBA/s	MAL/s
TESLA-I	MAC	30	延迟密钥	115	6	11
TESLA-Q	MAC	30	延迟密钥	115	1	1
ECDSA-Q^[11]	数字签名	512	签名私钥	256	3	4
ECDSA-Q^[11]	数字签名	512	公钥	512	3	4
斯坦福 TESLA-I^[14]	MAC	30	延迟密钥	115	6	11
斯坦福 ECDSA-Q^[14]	数字签名	448	签名私钥	112	2	2
斯坦福 ECDSA-Q^[14]	数字签名	448	公钥	224	2	2

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表 7 首次认证时间性能指标

Table 7. TTFA performance indicators s

方案	不接收OTAR 电文时间	t_max	t_min	t_ave	T_ave	T_min	T_ave
TESLA-I	6~12	360	54	139.2	6000	2406	3979.3
TESLA-Q	1~2	60	9	23.2	1000	401	663.9
TESLA-I	6~12	264	66	134.2	6000	3858	4989.4

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