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摘要:
欺骗干扰具有隐蔽性强、危害性大的特点，严重威胁全球导航卫星系统(GNSS)的安全稳定运行。目前基于运动单天线的欺骗干扰检测方法无法实现多来向欺骗干扰检测。为此，提出一种用于旋转单天线的基于波达方向角度差的欺骗干扰检测方法。该方法的本质是根据接收信号的载波相位估计一对信号之间的波达方向角度差。当没有欺骗信号时，波达方向角度差的估计值应与预测值一致。欺骗信号难以精确模拟导航信号的方向性，会破坏波达方向角度差的估计值和预测值一致性。因此，基于波达方向角度差的估计值和预测值建立检测变量，通过广义似然比检验(GLRT)可以检测多来向欺骗信号。进行软件仿真分析旋转单天线的参数对检测性能的影响，并通过现场试验进行验证和评估。结果表明：所提方法可高效实现多来向欺骗干扰的检测。
Abstract:Spoofing is a serious security risk to the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) because of its strong concealment and high harm features. Multi-directional spoofing detection is not possible with existing spoofing detection techniques that rely on moving single antennas. To achieve this, we provide a spoofing detection technique for a single spinning antenna that is based on the intersection angle between two directions of arrival. The essence of this method is to estimate the intersection angle between two directions of arrival based on the carrier phase difference of the received signal. The projected value and the estimated value of the intersection angle between two directions of arrival should match in the absence of spoofing. Spoofing is difficult to accurately simulate the directionality of navigation signals, which can disrupt the consistency between the estimated and predicted values of the intersection angle between two arrival directions. Therefore, a detection variable is established based on the estimated and predicted values of the intersection angle between two directions of arrival, and the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) can detect multi-directional spoofing. We used on-site experiments to confirm and assess the simulation to examine how single rotating antenna settings affect detection performance. The results indicate that the method proposed in this article can efficiently detect multi-directional spoofing.
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Key words:
- spoofing detection /
- carrier phase /
- direction of arrival /
- intersection angle /
- rotating antenna
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图 2 $ r\sin (\omega {T_0}) $与ROC曲线的关系
Figure 2. Relationship between $ r\sin (\omega {T_0}) $ and ROC curves
图 7 不同卫星组合下检测器值的变化曲线
Figure 7. The variation curves of detector values under different satellite combinations
表 1 仿真参数设置
Table 1. Simulation parameter settings
$r/{\text{m}}$ $\omega /({\mathrm{rad}}{{\cdot}}{{\text{s}}^{{{ - 1}}}})$ ${T_0}/{\text{s}}$ $\beta /(^\circ )$ $N$ $ \sigma _\varPhi ^2/{{\text{m}}^2} $ ${\text{d}}{\varphi _2}/(^\circ )$ ${\text{d}}{\theta _2}/(^\circ )$ 0.2 ${\text{π}}/6$ 1 70 100 0.02 10 10 
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