寡头垄断企业战略投资期权博弈模型

邱菀华; 余冬平

寡头垄断企业战略投资期权博弈模型

邱菀华¹,
余冬平²

1.
北京航空航天大学经济管理学院, 北京 100083
2. 中央财经大学国防经济与管理研究院, 北京 100081

基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372011); 高校博士点专项科研基金资助项目(20030006009)

详细信息

作者简介:
邱菀华(1946-),女,江西临川人,教授,cnwhqiu@yahoo.com.

中图分类号: F 830.59
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- 被引次数: 5
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2006-05-11
- 网络出版日期: 2006-10-31

Option games model of firm′s investment strategy in oligopoly

Qiu Wanhua¹,
Yu Dongping²

1.
School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100083, China
2. Institute of National Defense Economy and Management, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China

摘要

摘要: 研究了寡头垄断企业战略投资决策行为,系统分析了不完全竞争环境下最优实物期权执行战略均衡规则.研究表明:负的外部性下存在抢先/序贯和同时投资3类均衡,而正的外部性下只存在同时投资均衡;企业价值和最优投资临界值都随市场不确定性增大而增大;竞争互动加速了企业投资,甚至当企业数目趋于无穷大的时候,其投资临界值位于垄断与马歇尔投资临界值之间.
- 投资决策 /
- 实物期权 /
- 期权博弈 /
- 寡头垄断
Abstract: The firm′s investment strategy was examined in oligopoly and the firm′s optimal equilibrium exercise strategy of real options was analyzed systemicallyunder incomplete competition. The research shows that there are three equilibriums, such as preemption, sequence and simultaneous investment, when existing negative externalities, However, there is just simultaneous investment equilibrium, when positive externalities. The firm′s value and optimal investment threshold increase with the raise of market uncertainty. Competitive interaction accelerates investment, furthermore the threshold is between monopolistic investment threshold and Marshallian investment tlhreshold, even though the firm number is infinite.
- investment decision /
- real options /
- option games /
- oligopoly

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参考文献(1)

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